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A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
Ballistic-Missile Defense and U.S. Alliances
Robert C. Watts IV

A

lliances and ballistic-missile defense (BMD) are both significant elements of
U.S. security policy, but the emphasis on each may be changing. Since the
end of World War II, the global network of allies of the United States has been
a strategic cornerstone.1 The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy
reaffirms the vital role of alliances in U.S. security, but President Trump’s interactions with traditional U.S. partners suggest a new degree of fluidity in these longstanding relationships.2 BMD’s importance surged in the first half of the Trump
administration, particularly after North Korea tested ballistic missiles that could
threaten the U.S. homeland. In response, the U.S. Congress increased the Missile
Defense Agency’s funding by over one-third, from $8.2 billion in 2017 to $11.5
billion in 2018.3 How might an increased emphasis on BMD affect U.S. alliance
relationships?
U.S. defense policy contends that BMD
strengthens alliances. The historical record, howCommander Robert C. Watts IV is the executive officer of USS John Paul Jones, a destroyer based in ever, is mixed. While BMD has bolstered alliances
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. He also served in a cruiser
at times, at other times it has exacerbated allies’
and destroyer in Norfolk, Virginia, a destroyer in Japan, and a minehunter in Bahrain. He served ashore doubts about U.S. commitment. Why have allies
at U.S. Fleet Forces Command, in the office of the
responded so differently to BMD and what are
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and in the Navy Forthe implications for contemporary U.S. policy?
eign Liaison Office. He was commissioned in 2002
through the Navy ROTC unit at the University of
Variations in threat perceptions, relative depenVirginia, where he majored in history and foreign
dence and vulnerability, and expectations of U.S.
affairs. He earned a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College commitment could cause an ally to perceive that
in 2009 and a master’s in public policy from Prince U.S. BMD increases the risk of abandonment or
ton University in 2017.
entrapment—meaning that the United States
might either shirk an alliance obligation or drag an
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ally into a war, respectively.4 When determining BMD policy and investments,
U.S. leaders should consider not only expected defensive benefits but also how
their decisions might affect allies’ perceptions of alliance cohesion and credibility.
After providing theoretical background on alliances and the concepts of
abandonment and entrapment, this article will review how U.S. policy expects
BMD to benefit alliances. It then tests this policy framework against two sets of
case studies. The first set examines the earliest U.S. BMD system—Sentinel—in
the late 1960s and its impact on alliance relationships with Japan and European
NATO allies. The second set considers BMD since the end of the Cold War and
again evaluates its effect on the Japanese and NATO alliances, and adds South
Korea. The article lastly recommends how these lessons from the past and the
present can better inform contemporary U.S. BMD policy.
ALLIANCE THEORY: ABANDONMENT AND ENTRAPMENT
States form alliances to increase their security efficiently. In an anarchic world,
states must provide for their own security but often try to minimize costly defense spending.5 A country typically seeks security by self-strengthening (i.e.,
building up its own military) and by allying with other nations. Alliances have
several potential benefits, such as distributing risk among multiple partners and
improving security more quickly and cheaply than self-strengthening.6 That
being said, allies may share the fiscal burden unevenly and alliances often involve other, less tangible costs.7 For example, a state may sacrifice some political
autonomy to gain security in an alliance.8 A cohesive alliance—one in which its
members share common interests and agree on how to achieve them—is more
likely to be effective and valuable to its members than one that is not.9
The credibility of one ally’s commitment to fight for the other or to restrain
itself from undesirable adventurism is an essential element of alliance cohesion
and effectiveness. An ally that doubts its partner’s credibility could fear either
abandonment or entrapment.10 One ally could abandon another by ending the
alliance, defecting to a different alliance, or abrogating an alliance commitment.
Entrapment, on the other hand, means that one country could drag an ally into
a war even if the conflict were contrary to the ally’s interests. Some analysts contend that states rarely are entrapped, but more often are subject to entanglement,
meaning that a state supports its ally in an undesirable undertaking to uphold
alliance cohesion.11 Whether entrapment or entanglement, these related concepts
involve one country’s fear that sacrificing autonomy to an alliance will expose it
to more risk.
If an ally fears that it could be abandoned or entrapped, it might try to mitigate this risk, which then could undermine alliance cohesion, effectiveness, and
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efficiency. To counter the risk of abandonment, an ally could discount the alliance’s value and offset that loss by self-strengthening or finding new allies.
Alternatively, it could increase its own level of commitment to the alliance—or
threaten to abandon the alliance—to spur the wavering ally to reaffirm its allegiance. Lastly, it could reduce the need for an alliance by reconciling with its
opponent. Similarly, an ally fearing entrapment could preemptively quit the alliance, appease the potential adversary to reduce the risk of an entrapping conflict,
or take other steps—such as reducing its own commitment to the alliance—to
restrain the ally before it starts an alliance-triggering conflict.12 If an ally perceives that its partner might abandon or entrap it, alliance cohesion likely would
weaken and the pact would become less valuable and credible in the eyes of both
members and adversaries.
The late Glenn Snyder, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina,
proposed the theory of the “alliance security dilemma” to explain why an alliance member might fear abandonment or entrapment.13 The security dilemma,
on which his theory is based, suggests that actions taken by a state to increase its
power and improve its security in turn will make other countries feel less secure,
causing them to strengthen their power as well. After this action and reaction, the
original state again feels insecure and further increases its power, and so on in a
vicious cycle.14 Snyder proposed that a similar dilemma exists within an alliance.
An alliance member likely assesses the cost and risk of being abandoned or entrapped by an ally. Actions to reduce the risk of one outcome are apt to make the
other more likely. Doubling down on an alliance commitment may mitigate the
risk of abandonment but increase the risk of entrapment. Conversely, loosening
alliance ties may avoid entrapment but raise the specter of abandonment.15 The alliance security dilemma makes it difficult for an alliance to achieve and maintain
cohesion, which lies between the two extremes of abandonment and entrapment.
Snyder offered several variables that can determine whether a hypothetical alliance will be cohesive or a member will fear abandonment or entrapment. These
factors include the extent of shared interests, one ally’s dependence on the other,
and the explicitness and credibility of the alliance commitment. First, Snyder
defined interests as whether allies share common objectives and a common opponent. Overlapping interests minimize the risk of abandonment or entrapment.
Second, relative dependence measures how much one ally needs the other’s
support—and how each partner perceives this dependency. A country is more
likely to fear abandonment if it perceives itself as being highly dependent on its
ally, while that ally is less dependent on it. Third, commitment combines both
the degree of promised support stipulated in an alliance agreement and also the
credibility of that on the basis of the ally’s past behavior and reputation, as well as
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one country’s judgment about its ally’s expected future behavior.16 Snyder’s model
of interests, dependency, and commitment may help assess how allies perceive
U.S. BMD capabilities.
Arguably, missile defense affects how allies view the credibility of U.S. alliance
commitments.17 To gauge how and why U.S. BMD capabilities might influence allied fears of abandonment or entrapment, this article adapts Snyder’s variables to
the BMD context. First, discussions of allies’ shared interests should incorporate
their threat perceptions. For instance, if allies do not agree on the importance
or imminence of a missile threat, this divergent perception likely would reduce
perceived mutual dependence and commitment, spurring fears of abandonment.
Second, calculations of relative dependence should consider whether BMD technology and its ostensible benefits are restricted from, available to, or even networked with an ally. An ally’s access to BMD’s defensive benefits not only affects
its dependence on the United States but may change the relative vulnerability
between the United States and its ally. Just as Snyder predicts that a high variation in dependence contributes to fears of abandonment, these differences in how
BMD technology is employed and shared could affect an ally’s assessment of its
dependence and relative vulnerability, thereby bolstering or weakening perceptions of the likelihood of abandonment. Modern BMD systems, some of which
depend on cross-border sensor networks and forward-deployed weapons, could
reduce perceived differences in dependence and vulnerability, thereby lessening
abandonment fears but possibly raising entrapment risks. Lastly, U.S. allies could
regard U.S. BMD policy and deployment decisions as indicators of U.S. alliance
commitment. For example, basing U.S. BMD systems in an allied country might
send a signal of strong U.S. commitment, while enlarging BMD systems in the
continental United States and also reducing overseas troop deployments might
send the opposite signal.
After reviewing the theoretical foundation of alliances, this article next examines the expected benefits of BMD to U.S. alliance relationships.
POLICY PERSPECTIVE:
BMD IMPROVES ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS
Contemporary U.S. policy identifies three reasons why U.S. BMD capabilities
should improve alliance relationships. First, BMD protects U.S. military capabilities at home and abroad, which should reassure allies that the United States will
be able to fulfill its commitments. Second, BMD directly benefits allies by defending their forces, people, and territories. Third, BMD opens up new avenues for
military integration and industrial cooperation with allies. Official policy documents across recent presidential administrations highlight these three benefits.
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Similarly, the academic and policy analysis communities also widely, but not
universally, describe a constructive relationship between BMD and U.S. alliances.
The 2002 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, issued by the George
W. Bush administration, argued that BMD capabilities would reassure allies,
defend them, and encourage international defense cooperation. First, fielding
BMD capabilities would “devalue missiles as tools of extortion and aggression,”
preventing a ballistic-missile-armed state from using those weapons to forestall
U.S. intervention on behalf of an ally, thus enhancing the credibility of U.S. deterrence and alliance commitments. Second, BMD would protect “not only the
United States and deployed forces, but also friends and allies” against the widely
proliferated missile threat. Finally, the United States should encourage allies to
help develop BMD technologies.18 This three-pronged perspective on how BMD
should benefit alliances continued into the Obama and Trump administrations.
The Obama administration’s 2009–10 Ballistic Missile Defense Review again
emphasized that BMD could improve U.S. alliance relationships.19 It asserted that
BMD is “integral” to pursuing “collaborative approaches with allies and partners”
and again highlighted three benefits of BMD to U.S. alliances. First, BMD would
reassure allies that the United States will uphold its alliance commitments despite
the increased ballistic-missile threat. Second, BMD would protect allied population centers and essential military capabilities. Finally, the United States would
both share and codevelop BMD technology with U.S. allies.20 The Bush and
Obama BMD policies demonstrate a consensus about BMD’s potential to benefit
alliance relationships that has extended across U.S. presidential administrations
and political parties and has continued into the Trump administration.
Trump administration policy has affirmed the importance of BMD to national
security and shared the view that missile defense benefits U.S. alliances. The 2017
National Security Strategy describes the threat that advanced missiles pose to
the United States and its allies and advocates improving U.S. and allied missiledefense capabilities.21 The 2019 Missile Defense Review (MDR) notes that “missile
defense plays an increasingly important role in . . . reinforcing the indivisibility
of U.S. and allied security” by protecting allies, assuring them of U.S. commitment, deterring attacks, and creating opportunities for cooperation and burden
sharing.22 Consistent with these policy documents, the Trump administration has
continued to cooperate closely with allies on missile defense. Examples include
deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense batteries to South Korea, successfully testing the SM-3 Block IIA missile codeveloped with Japan, and improving missile-defense capabilities in Europe.23
Some scholars and policy analysts agree with this political consensus but
also suggest other ways BMD should strengthen U.S. alliances. Brad Roberts (of
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Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a former Obama administration
official responsible for missile defense) argues that BMD benefits alliance ties by
demonstrating U.S. resolve, reducing the political pressure to escalate a conflict
prematurely, and constraining an opponent’s ability to use ballistic missiles as a
coercive tool.24 Stephan Frühling of the Australian National University points
out that because of BMD’s defensive nature, the United States can employ it to
demonstrate alliance commitment in a “generally non-threatening manner.”25
Roberts and Frühling also both assert that BMD bolsters the credibility of U.S.
extended deterrence, referring to the commitment to use nuclear weapons in
defense of certain allies.26 Amy Woolf of the Congressional Research Service adds
that BMD capabilities can protect critical infrastructure abroad, can ensure that
the United States can deploy forces in defense of an ally, and can help form or
maintain coalitions. As an example, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, deployed
Patriot batteries both defended key installations in Saudi Arabia and helped
restrain Israeli retaliation against Iraqi missile attacks.27 However, Ted Postol, a
physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a BMD skeptic, asserts
that some of the political benefits of BMD to U.S. allies during the Gulf War were
merely “serendipitous” rather than a repeatable outcome.28 Yet despite some such
dissenting views, there appears to be broad agreement that BMD contributes to
alliance cohesion.
U.S. BMD policy across recent administrations has argued consistently that
BMD benefits U.S. alliances. Although U.S. strategists intend for BMD employment at home or abroad to benefit U.S. alliances, this article next will analyze
allies’ perspectives on U.S. BMD to see whether their perceptions match with or
differ from U.S. policy expectations.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
ALLIES’ MIXED RESPONSES TO U.S. BMD
Case studies from two different eras of U.S. missile defense offer the opportunity
to test the theory that BMD strengthens alliance relationships, and they reveal
that BMD has not always improved these ties. The first period begins with deliberations about deploying the Sentinel antiballistic missile (ABM) system in 1965
and ends with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Although BMD technology and the international security environment of the 1960s do not compare cleanly with contemporary circumstances, U.S. government documents from this period shed light on
internal debates and decisions.29 The second period begins with U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty in 2001 and continues to the present, permitting analysis
of modern missile defenses in a contemporary technological and strategic setting.
This article assesses the bilateral U.S.-Japan alliance and the multilateral
NATO alliance in both time frames and adds the U.S.–South Korea alliance in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/5
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the second period. Cold War scholar Michael Mandelbaum has described the
U.S.-Japan alliance and NATO as the world’s only “nuclear alliances”—alliances
in which the United States has committed to employing nuclear arms in their
defense.30 That these alliances depend on nuclear deterrence makes BMD particularly relevant to alliance cohesion, either by providing some protection from
a nuclear attack or by defending U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities. The second
period adds South Korea because U.S. nuclear deterrence also pertains to this alliance and the 2017 deployment of THAAD to South Korea provides insight into
modern entrapment risks.31
Pre–ABM Treaty (1965–72)
On 18 September 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to field Sentinel, an ABM system intended to defend U.S. territory against the anticipated threat of a small number of
Chinese nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).32 The Johnson administration described Sentinel as a “thin” defense, meaning it would protect large areas of the United States against a small number of missiles.33 Sentinel
would have employed nuclear-armed interceptors. Existing guidance technology
was not accurate enough to use either a conventional high-explosive or kinetic
(“hit-to-kill”) warhead like the one that modern BMD interceptors use.34
While the debate within the Johnson administration about Sentinel largely
weighed its limited military use against domestic political considerations, U.S.
policy makers also evaluated its likely impact on alliance relationships.35 U.S.
government documents exhibit how U.S. officials expected allies to respond to
ABM deployment. The limited scope of the ballistic-missile threat, Sentinel’s
U.S.-exclusive nature, and how this decision interacted with other signals of alliance cohesion complicated U.S. efforts to assure allies that this new capability
did not signal a change in Washington’s security commitments. Sentinel generally
benefited relations with Japan but sparked fears of abandonment among many
NATO allies.
In the 1960s, nuclear arms and ICBMs were new technologies that had not
proliferated widely yet; only one major nuclear power, the Soviet Union (USSR),
and one emerging nuclear state, the People’s Republic of China, concerned the
United States. By 1965, U.S. observers believed that the USSR had over two
hundred ICBMs, so the Soviet arsenal already was too big to defend against
cost-effectively.36 McNamara noted that “any ABM system can rather obviously
be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads or dummy
warheads than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them.” He
projected that developing a Soviet-oriented ABM system would lead to each side
spending more on defenses, only “to be relatively at the same point of balance on
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the security scale that we are now.”37 According to his analysis, the limited security gained by a “heavy,” or high-capacity, anti-Soviet ABM system would not be
worth the expense.
Mindful of the limitations of ABM capabilities, U.S. policy makers instead
designed Sentinel as a “thin,” or relatively low-capacity, defense against the anticipated Chinese threat. U.S. government analysts believed that China was not
yet developing ICBMs but was likely to have a small number of them by 1975.38
Because of America’s overwhelming nuclear superiority, McNamara asserted
that it would be “insane and suicidal” for China to attack the United States, but
by deploying a “Chinese-oriented ABM . . . we wish to reduce such possibilities
to a minimum.” He further argued that Sentinel would “indicate to Asians that
we intend to deter China from nuclear blackmail,” hinting at potential benefits
to U.S. credibility.39
Sentinel was exclusive to the United States. Allies gained neither protection
from ballistic missiles nor opportunities for industrial cooperation.40 Washington considered Sentinel to be too costly and complex for allies and infeasible to
deploy overseas. Allies were geographically too close to the threats, meaning that
a forward-deployed ABM system would not have enough reaction time to work
effectively.41 Furthermore, the interceptors’ nuclear warheads raised significant
command-and-control challenges and introduced risk that an ally could modify
ABM interceptors into nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Mindful of how allies
might recoil against ABM restrictions, a State Department official said in a 1967
meeting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that U.S. policy was “to
discourage decisions by friendly countries in favor of an ABM defense—but to do
so in a manner that would avoid damage to our relations with those countries.”42
This approach essentially sought to limit the political impact of restricting missile defense from allies by dodging the topic rather than meaningfully consulting
with valued partners.43
In this period, U.S. policy makers could not determine whether ABM defense
improved or undermined allies’ perceptions of U.S. commitment. A 1965 State
Department study on the “possible political and psychological effects” of such a
system suggested that NATO allies could view it either as “underwriting U.S. willingness to fulfill its commitments” or as “lending credence to the Gaullist view
that the U.S. is not really fully committed to Europe.” This analysis was also of
two minds about Asian responses. Creation of defenses against a Chinese nuclear
attack, in the form of an ABM system, might cause Asian countries to “conclude
that the U.S. would stand by its commitments.”44 Conversely, “it might appear
that the U.S. did not place a sufficiently high value on its commitments to warrant risking even a limited nuclear attack,” and ABM deployment might inflate
perceptions of China’s threat in Asia unnecessarily.45
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/5
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The Department of Defense also studied likely allied responses to Sentinel.
In May 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that allies would view the ABM
decision in the context of U.S. efforts to increase allied defense participation and
reduce “US involvement abroad (particularly in Asia).” If allies perceived that
the United States was “beginning to look more inward than outward,” they might
view ballistic-missile defenses negatively. “To European and Japanese thinking
only in terms of their own protection, a project to ‘defend the United States’ may
have little realistic appeal, unless they can be convinced that a system which
protects the strategic war making capability of the United States also helps deter
a strike against their own countries.” The report concluded that Japan, whose
“strategic views . . . are less fixed than those of the Europeans,” would be interested in ABM technology and would appreciate that “such a system might make
the United States less susceptible to Soviet or Communist Chinese nuclear blackmail.” In Europe, however, a decision to deploy an ABM system “would unnerve
NATO,” and “further undermine European confidence in US intentions to fulfill
its nuclear commitments to the Alliance.”46 The upcoming sections demonstrate
that this analysis proved prescient: Japanese leaders felt that ABM deployment
would benefit alliance cohesion, while ABM heightened abandonment fears
among many European NATO allies.
Japan: BMD and U.S. Credibility. Japanese policy makers believed the U.S. ABM
program would strengthen alliance cohesion and responded favorably to American plans. Their reaction stemmed from shared threat perceptions, the limited
effect of any ABM deployment on the already-high mutual dependence between
the two countries, and other signs of Washington’s commitment that Tokyo valued more highly.
Bilateral ABM discussions and Japan’s reactions to China’s nascent nuclear
capability indicate that in the mid-1960s Japan and the United States assessed the
Chinese threat similarly. Starting as early as November 1965, U.S. and Japanese
diplomats and military officers routinely discussed the future Chinese nuclear
threat, ABM defense, and its implications for the alliance.47 Reflecting their concern about the Chinese threat, senior Japanese defense officials asked whether
ABMs could be used against shorter-range Chinese missiles that could strike
Japan, and asked for “data for use in planning anti-missile defenses,” even though
“they would require deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil.”48 Because
of the warheads involved, U.S. participants discouraged such planning. In 1966,
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported that China’s successful nuclear
weapons tests had made the “Chinese Communist threat to Japan credible,” and
Japan’s “leading papers . . . for the first time unanimously [warned] of the possible Chinese menace to Japan’s security.”49 Furthermore, in an internal Japanese
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government report (referred to as the 1968/70 Report) leading nuclear experts
warned that future Chinese nuclear capabilities could both threaten Japan and
weaken the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.50 These analyses suggest that
both Japan’s political leaders and the public likely viewed China’s nuclear capability as threatening, which aligned with the U.S. perspective.
Japan highly depended on U.S. security guarantees, and plans to field Sentinel
did not change this circumstance dramatically, especially at a time when many
other issues played a more important role in the relationship. The 1960 mutual
defense treaty between the two countries included extended deterrence under
the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella. Even if Japanese leaders doubted U.S. credibility, the authors of the 1968/70 Report concluded, they had no better alternative
than to rely on U.S. extended deterrence.51 Furthermore, Japan’s rehabilitating
economy and peace-oriented constitution limited its options for military modernization and prohibited it from pursuing nuclear weapons.52 Several other significant events in the late 1960s encouraged close communication and cooperation between Tokyo and Washington rather than one-sided dependence. These
catalyzing events included Japan’s efforts to recover Okinawa, the increasing involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, the renegotiation of the 1960
treaty, and the U.S. desire for Japan to assume a larger role in East Asian security.53
From an alliance-management perspective, the ABM question created opportunities to consult with Japan and treat it as a valued security partner, not
just a client. Although the United States would not share ABM technology with
Japan, the United States provided detailed information about ABM capabilities
and U.S. intentions. In May 1967, the U.S. ambassador to Japan met with the viceministers of Japan’s foreign ministry and its defense agency to discuss technical
details concerning ABMs and to explain the rationale for U.S. deployment decisions. One U.S. military participant was surprised by the frank conversations
and the technological details that U.S. participants provided. “I was impressed
(amazed) at the amount of substantive material and discussion given by our side
at this meeting.”54 Open communication with an ally, particularly on sensitive
subjects, can buttress alliance cohesion, and may have had that effect on the
Japanese in this case.55
In these meetings, Japanese policy makers explicitly stated their belief that
ABM deployment would strengthen the credibility of U.S. commitments, but
also noted that it was not a very important factor. In May 1967, Vice-Minister
Nobuhiko Ushiba of the foreign ministry said that Japan “believed that a U.S.
ABM deployment would enhance the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.”56 In August 1967, only weeks before McNamara’s Sentinel announcement, Vice-Minister
Yoshio Miwa of the Japan Defense Agency reaffirmed to U.S. ambassador U.
Alexis Johnson that Sentinel “would increase U.S. credibility,” but reminded
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/5
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him that Japan still considered the “deterrent power of the U.S.” to be the “most
effective method to protect Asian countries.” Johnson then asked Miwa and his
foreign ministry counterpart, Vice-Minister Ushiba, what the United States could
do “to maintain its deterrent capability.” Ushiba replied that “repeated assurances
on suitable occasions” were more important than an ABM system itself, and
emphasized the point by saying, “We believe your words.”57 Public pronouncements that the United States would defend Japan bolstered its confidence in U.S.
defense commitments.58 Japan had full faith in U.S. alliance commitments. An
ABM system might have strengthened Japan’s perception of U.S. credibility, but
it was not the most important factor.
Shared threat perceptions, high-but-constant mutual dependence, and faith in
U.S. security commitments all contributed to Japan’s acceptance of U.S. Sentinel
ABM plans and to some degree bolstered Japan’s assessment of the U.S. commitment. This outcome roughly matches what modern U.S. BMD policy expects.
NATO allies, on the other hand, reacted negatively to Sentinel.
NATO: Fear of “Fortress America.” Western European NATO allies, particularly
the nuclear-armed United Kingdom, believed that U.S. ABM plans increased the
risk of U.S. abandonment in the face of a Soviet attack. Allied concerns stemmed
from differing threat perceptions, expected changes in mutual vulnerability, and
broader concerns about the credibility of U.S. commitments.
Many Western European NATO members—including both of the nucleararmed allies (the United Kingdom and France) and West Germany—were concerned that the United States might prefer to defend itself from a Soviet strategic
strike rather than deter an attack on European allies with a credible guarantee
of U.S. nuclear retaliation.59 U.S. BMD by itself may have increased allied perceptions of U.S. credibility, but NATO allies expected that U.S. deployment of
an ABM system coincident with countervailing Soviet defenses would have the
opposite effect.
Western European governments and policy analysts were leery of Sentinel’s
expected deployment. As early as July 1965, the U.K. Foreign Office assessed that
ABM deployment would not upend the “balance of deterrence” between NATO
and the Soviet Union but might “tilt it and thus increase tension and instability.”
It warned that the “disparity between Europe and the two super-powers would
be increased to the disadvantage of Europe” and that U.S. ABM deployment
would “strengthen the hand of Gaullists and would be unhealthy for the Atlantic Alliance.”60 A month after this analysis, Britain’s ambassador to the United
States warned Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the ABM decision was “likely
to have important consequences” for “the position of Europe within the Western
Alliance.”61 Summarizing European worries, Johan Holst, a Norwegian defense
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analyst who was later Norway’s minister of defense and minister of foreign affairs, wrote that ABM deployment “might look like an expression of American
neo-isolationism, a return to Fortress America based on self-defense without
entanglements.” Holst acknowledged that if the United States alone had BMD
that might “strengthen the alliance by adding potency to the U.S. guarantee,” but
the dual fielding of U.S. and Soviet BMD systems, he argued, “might on balance
also be perceived as reducing the validity of the [U.S.] guarantee.”62 These concerns about U.S. ABM plans likely were rooted in divergent perceptions of the
ballistic-missile threat.
NATO allies disagreed with the U.S. assessment of the Chinese strategic
nuclear threat. Britain’s Foreign Office concluded that a nuclear war with China
was “not at present on the cards [sic].”63 Some European analysts, such as Britain’s
Laurence W. Martin, then believed that American fears of “China’s embryonic
nuclear force” were “hysterical and dangerous” and “exaggerated.”64 Others suspected that the U.S. focus on the Chinese threat was a pretext to field an ABM
system that would grow from a thin system into a larger, heavy one that could
defend the United States against the Soviet ICBM threat.65 Even if the Chinese
threat was not a duplicitous justification, some European observers thought that,
as ABM technology improved, U.S. political leaders would not be able to resist future U.S. domestic pressures to build a heavy system that would affect European
security more negatively.66 Additionally, because the United States withheld ABM
technologies from NATO allies, the system offered them no security from Soviet
nuclear and conventional forces arrayed against Western Europe.
Although the Soviet Union posed different threats to the United States and Europe, without missile defenses the United States and Europe faced similar levels
of risk. Sentinel changed this perception of shared vulnerability. A 1967 report on
European views of Sentinel by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) noted that “many in Europe believe . . . that the advent of this new
military technology . . . will result in greater difference in the degree of security
enjoyed by countries on the two sides of the Atlantic, to the disadvantage of Western Europe.” Parallel ABM deployments in the Soviet Union could exacerbate this
change in relative vulnerability. Helmut Schmidt, then a parliamentary leader of
West Germany’s Social Democratic Party and later West Germany’s chancellor,
opposed any ABM deployment for this reason. According to the 1967 INR report,
he thought that such a course “would lead to a rapid erosion of both the NATO
and Warsaw Pacts” because the superpower in each alliance might become more
comfortable with the idea of defending itself rather than keeping its deterrence
commitments. He also thought that this gap between the United States and the
Soviet Union, as ABM-capable states, and the other countries in Europe “would
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cause a crisis of confidence on the part of the [Western European countries]
about the [U.S.] nuclear guarantee.”67
This concern that BMD might change the relative vulnerability between the
United States and its European allies was not limited to European political leaders but likely was shared by some members of the public. European newspapers
exhibited similar anxiety about the advent of U.S. and Soviet BMD. An editorial
in Hamburg’s Die Welt opined that “[a] Europe sandwiched between the two
ABM-equipped world powers is confronted with the alternatives of continued
nuclear protection by the respective superpowers—a protection that implies
increased dependence—or of withdrawing this protection.” A writer in the
Frankfurter Allgemeine claimed that the expected deployment of ABM systems
would “accentuate the differences between the haves and have-nots and increase
fears among the latter.”68 An article in France’s Le Monde identified the challenge
the ABM concept posed to France’s and Britain’s small nuclear deterrents: “The
advent of the ABMs has every chance of limiting the strategic [nuclear] game to
the very big powers.”69 According to these perspectives, the advent of an ABM
system would improve U.S. defenses while simultaneously undercutting Western
Europe’s, thus significantly changing Western European perceptions of the relative vulnerability between the United States and Europe.
Broader fears of a “decoupling” between European and American interests, combined with sparse consultation with NATO allies about ABM policy,
worsened Western European worries of U.S. abandonment. In the early years
of the Cold War, the U.S. promise of extended deterrence was credible partly
because the United States based nuclear weapons in Europe, from which they
could better reach Soviet targets.70 The development of U.S. strategic weapons,
such as the Minuteman ICBM and the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic
missile—which could be launched from U.S. territory or the open ocean,
respectively—meant that the United States could remove some of its weapons
from Europe. The United States still pledged to use nuclear weapons in response
to a Soviet attack on Europe, but the shrinking U.S. nuclear presence in Europe
heightened allied doubts.71 The decision to deploy an ABM system exacerbated
the sense that the United States was weakening its nuclear commitment to Europe’s defense.72 Additionally, despite some ABM discussions with the United
Kingdom in 1966, the United States consulted with other NATO allies only
days before McNamara announced Sentinel.73 This approach effectively forced
a controversial issue on the alliance as a fait accompli and—in contrast to the
approach taken with Japan—appeared to European observers to be a deliberate snub of alliance consultative processes, which European allies valued as a
symbol of transatlantic solidarity.74
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Divergent threat assessments, changing perceptions of relative vulnerability,
and wariness about U.S. security commitments all contributed to European allies’
fears that the United States might abandon its nuclear commitments. This outcome does not align with what modern U.S. BMD policy expects, and contemporary analysts should appreciate that allies could again perceive U.S. BMD investments as increasing the risk of abandonment, particularly if threat assessments
differ, relative vulnerability changes inequitably, or other factors compound allied
doubts about U.S. commitment. Noting but skipping over the era of the ABM
Treaty (1972–2001), this article next will examine several modern case studies.
Modern BMD (2001–Present)
Sentinel and follow-on U.S. ABM systems affected U.S. alliances less than first
expected because the 1972 ABM Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union curtailed ABM efforts. The treaty limited the size and scope of ABM
systems and imposed constraints on future research and development. It also
distinguished between strategic and theater ballistic-missile defenses, restricting
the former more tightly.75 By defending the United States against a long-range
ICBM threat, Sentinel would have been considered a strategic system, while a
shorter-range system such as the modern Patriot missile would have been classified as a theater defense. By limiting the United States and the Soviet Union to
no more than one hundred strategic ABM weapons, the treaty emphasized the
importance of nuclear deterrence rather than missile defense.76 Within a few
years, the United States abandoned its ABM program and did not field strategic
BMD systems again until after President George W. Bush withdrew from the
ABM Treaty in December 2001.77
The Bush administration withdrew from the treaty partly because of the
changing ballistic-missile threat.78 Unlike in the 1960s, contemporary ballisticmissile threats were diversifying and proliferating. Modern conventionally armed ballistic missiles were increasingly attractive alternatives to manned
strike aircraft because they were cheaper to produce or purchase, required less
expertise to employ, and were difficult to defend against.79 No longer simply a
weapon in the nuclear superpower standoff, in the post–Cold War environment
ballistic missiles posed a worldwide challenge to the United States and its allies.80
Today, over thirty countries have ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150
kilometers.81
Over recent decades, BMD has broadened to include not only defending the
continental United States from ICBMs (homeland defense) but also protecting
deployed U.S. forces and allies from ballistic missiles with shorter ranges (regional defense). U.S. homeland defense—like strategic defense before it—focuses
on defending against countries such as North Korea and Iran that have, or might
in the future have, small numbers of ICBMs, rather than against countries with
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larger nuclear arsenals, such as China or Russia.82 A network of land-, sea-, and
space-based sensors support this mission.83 The ground-based interceptor (GBI)
would be used to defend against ICBMs, but only forty-four are fielded, and they
have had mixed success in live-fire tests.84 To borrow terms from the Johnson
administration, one could best describe U.S. homeland defense as a thin rather
than a heavy system.
Regional defense employs a range of sensors and weapons to defend deployed
forces and allies against shorter-range threats in the midcourse and terminal
phases of flight. Midcourse defense involves intercepting missiles while they are
outside the atmosphere. Terminal defense means intercepting a ballistic missile
as it descends toward its target.85 Some USN ships with the Aegis combat system
and AN/SPY-1 radar are BMD capable and can employ SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors against targets in the midcourse and terminal phases, respectively. The U.S.
Army has BMD sensors such as the AN/TPY-2 radar and weapons such as the
THAAD and Patriot missile systems for terminal defense. These Navy and Army
weapons use either conventional explosive or kinetic—so-called hit-to-kill—
warheads.86 Notably, some of the regional BMD sensors, such as the shipborne
AN/SPY-1 or the land-based AN/TPY-2, also can provide U.S. homeland defenses with earlier detection and tracking of an incoming missile.87
BMD no longer is an exclusive U.S. capability. It is now accessible to and even
networked with U.S. allies, many of whom face ballistic-missile threats and have
acquired or developed missile defenses. The United States encourages allies to
participate in BMD efforts and advocates interoperability across national systems.88 Nineteen individual nations and the NATO alliance cooperate with the
United States on BMD. This cooperation has included pooling research-anddevelopment efforts, acquiring interoperable BMD systems, hosting U.S. BMD
systems, and coordinating operational employment.89 The 2019 MDR emphasizes the importance of “interoperability among various [U.S. and allied] missile
defense capabilities, to include command and control networks, sensors, and
[integrated air and missile defense] systems.”90 A ballistic missile’s speed, altitude,
and range limit the time available for detection, tracking, and interception.91 The
United States tackles this challenge by sharing information among different sensors and interceptors to improve engagement opportunities and by conducting
deliberate planning and decentralizing decision-making to shorten engagement
timelines.92 Cooperation with interoperable allies could improve both U.S. and
allied defenses further by broadening sensor coverage, increasing the number
of available interceptors, and planning and executing combined defenses better.
Similarly to the pre–ABM Treaty period, modern BMD’s effect on U.S. alliance relationships appears closely related to shared threat perceptions, relative
dependence and vulnerability, and other signs of U.S. commitment. In Japan,
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these factors arguably have enabled BMD to overcome Tokyo’s fear of entrapment and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. In South Korea, cross-border BMD
integration has raised fears of entrapment. In Europe, as the United States began
fielding modern BMD systems there, some NATO allies initially were wary of
abandonment, but as the threat evolved and U.S. deployment plans changed these
fears subsided.
Japan: Overcoming Entrapment Fears and Embracing BMD Cooperation. U.S.
policy suggests that BMD demonstrates America’s commitment to work with and
defend allies around the world. Recent experience with Japan supports this argument. Japan and the United States similarly perceive the ballistic-missile threat,
BMD increases the overall dependence between the two countries while also
evenly reducing vulnerability, and forward-deployed BMD forces tangibly demonstrate U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense. As a result, U.S. BMD capabilities
appear to have improved the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Japan has worked closely with the United States on BMD since the late 1990s,
but its policy makers initially worried about entrapment risks. China’s 1996 missile exercises near Taiwan and North Korea’s missile testing in 1998 demonstrated
Japan’s vulnerability to ballistic missiles.93 By 2001, Japan’s Defense Agency identified BMD as “an important issue for Japan’s defense policy” but underscored
the importance of “[tackling] the issue independently.”94 Because modern BMD
systems typically are networked, Japan feared that closer BMD cooperation
with the United States might cause Japan to become embroiled in other regional
conflicts—such as in South Korea or Taiwan—even if it was not attacked directly.95 Defending another country also would have been inconsistent with Japan’s
constitutional prohibitions against collective self-defense.96 The government of
Japan announced its intentions to introduce BMD systems in December 2003,
but the announcement reflected its concern that BMD might lead to entrapment, or at least the appearance of participating in collective self-defense. Japan
underscored that the BMD system would defend only Japan (not so-called third
countries) and would “be operated on Japan’s independent judgement, . . . based
on the information . . . acquired by Japan’s own sensors.”97 This emphasis on BMD
independence waned, however, as the ballistic-missile threat to Japan increased.
More recently, shared threat perceptions drove Japan to cooperate closely
with the United States on missile defense. Regional ballistic-missile capabilities,
primarily in North Korea and China, have improved steadily, and the United
States and Japan both consider these weapons to be threats.98 As a result, Japan
no longer hesitates to integrate with U.S. systems. According to Japan’s 2016 defense white paper, “Further cooperation with the U.S. government including the
U.S. Forces in Japan is necessary for efficient and effective operation of the BMD
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system,” to include “real-time sharing of BMD operational . . . information.”99 A
strong, shared threat perception likely stimulated the alliance relationship.
The United States and Japan have robust joint BMD capabilities, which improve the security of both countries to a similar degree and increase their dependence on each other.100 BMD-capable USN ships are based in Yokosuka, Japan,
and regularly exercise with Japan’s own BMD-capable destroyers.101 The United
States and Japan collaboratively developed the SM-3 Block IIA, an advanced,
midcourse, regional defense interceptor that both navies use.102 The United
States has placed two AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan that provide information to
U.S. regional and homeland-defense systems and also share data with Japanese
defenses.103 Japan also employs U.S.-designed Patriot PAC-3 missiles and plans
to purchase two Aegis Ashore systems, a land-based adaptation of a naval BMD
capability.104 Furthermore, Japan has taken steps to coordinate BMD operations
better with the United States, such as establishing a Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint
Operation Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base, near Tokyo.105
Within the limits of Japan’s defense budget and political will, this close technical
and operational BMD cooperation enables it to benefit from BMD to a similar
extent to the United States.
Forward-deploying U.S. BMD forces to Japan also strongly signals U.S. commitment. According to the late political scientist Thomas Schelling, stationing
U.S. forces abroad communicates U.S. commitment beyond even their military
utility. Forward-deployed forces, particularly in a geographically constrained
and isolated area such as Japan, may act as a “trip wire.” If another country attacked Japan, these U.S. forces would come under attack as well, which would
make it politically difficult for the United States to fail to intervene. Furthermore,
defensive forces such as missile defenses place the onus on an opponent to take
the initiative and go on the offensive—likely ceding the moral high ground to
the United States and its allies.106 The presence of U.S. forces that include BMD
capabilities should deter an opponent from attacking and reassure Japan that the
United States is likely to follow through on its alliance commitments.
South Korea: Mitigating Entrapment Risks. As in Japan in the early years of last
decade, U.S. BMD capabilities have elicited fears of entrapment in South Korea. South Korea and the United States long have viewed North Korea’s ballistic
missiles as a threat, but North Korea’s numerous successful missile tests in 2017
increased South Korea’s concern to such an extent that it permitted the United
States to complete its politically controversial THAAD deployment.107 Despite
this shared threat perception, concern about dependence on the United States,
the risk of unintended cooperation with Japan, and expectations of U.S. behavior
all likely added to South Korea’s worry that U.S. BMD could result in entrapment.
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Entrapment and entanglement concerns have shaped South Korean leaders’
perceptions of BMD since at least 1999, when Seoul declined to participate in
nascent U.S. BMD efforts, partly because the effort might have damaged relations with Beijing.108 The recent U.S. deployment of the THAAD system to South
Korea revived this concern.109 China argues that THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar is
part of America’s homeland-defense sensor network and thus threatens China’s
limited nuclear deterrent, thereby leaving China vulnerable to U.S. nuclear coercion.110 Beijing retaliated against Seoul for agreeing to host THAAD by imposing
unofficial economic sanctions, including boycotts of popular Korean bands and
reduced Chinese tourism.111
The structure of U.S. alliances in East Asia also likely affects Seoul’s fear of
BMD-enabled entrapment. BMD integration could expose South Korea to entanglement with Japan, the other major ally of the United States in Northeast
Asia. Victor Cha, a Korea expert at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, describes South Korea and Japan as quasi allies because they share the
United States as a common ally but are not allied themselves.112 Although the
United States encourages closer defense cooperation between the two countries, animosity rooted in Japan’s decades-long occupation of Korea in the early
twentieth century inhibits closer alignment.113 Because U.S. and Japanese BMD
systems are integrated with each other already, adding South Korean BMD sensors and weapons into this network could support the defense of Japan directly,
or alternatively could cause South Korea to depend on Japanese systems to defend
itself. Either outcome likely would be unwelcome in South Korea, which is loath
to cooperate with Japan.114
To mitigate these risks of entrapment or entanglement, in 2006 Seoul began
developing the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) as an alternative to
U.S. BMD systems.115 Referring to KAMD, South Korea’s defense minister said
in 2013 that “we will not join the U.S. missile defense system, but take our own
path.” KAMD includes a mix of domestic and international components, such as
an Israeli-made early warning radar, the U.S. Aegis BMD-capable naval weapon
system, and South Korean and U.S. interceptors.116 Economic motivations also
shaped KAMD. South Korea purchased some secondhand weapons to reduce
costs and bought some domestic equipment to spur its defense industry.117 Despite these efforts at independent BMD, some South Korean analysts remain
skeptical about the distinction between KAMD and U.S. BMD systems, positing
that “it is only a matter of time” before KAMD is “integrated into the U.S.-led efforts to create ballistic missile defense in the Asian-Pacific region.”118
Despite these concerns, South Korea recognizes the importance to its defense
of interoperability with U.S. systems. Despite Seoul’s efforts to minimize the
risks of entrapment or entanglement, South Korea continues to cooperate with
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the United States on other BMD efforts, such as participating in multinational
(United States, Japan, and South Korea) naval BMD exercises and building three
BMD-capable warships incorporating the U.S. Aegis combat system.119 In the
future Seoul could determine that the security benefits of closer BMD integration
with the United States may outweigh the entrapment risks. Furthermore, KAMD
maintains optional interoperability with the United States. According to South
Korea’s 2016 defense white paper, Seoul desires to strengthen “both ROK-U.S.
combined capabilities and independent capabilities . . . to effectively deter and
respond to mounting nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.”120 South
Korea’s actions and words suggest that, despite a desire for BMD independence,
it does not reject cooperation with the United States completely.
South Korea’s perceptions of U.S. commitment and expected behavior also
likely color Seoul’s perceived risk of entrapment or abandonment. Some scholars
have observed that during the Cold War South Korea primarily feared abandonment, but since the end of the Cold War it more often has feared entrapment,
partly because of the sometimes aggressive U.S. military stance toward North
Korea.121 President Trump’s bellicose rhetoric toward North Korea and reports in
2017 of planning for a limited strike on North Korea might have raised further
South Korea’s fear of entrapment.122 On the other hand, Trump’s call for renegotiating the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement or suspending combined military
exercises after the 2018 Singapore summit with Pyongyang’s Kim Jong-un could
send confusing messages about Washington’s commitment to Seoul.123 Whether
U.S. BMD causes an ally to fear abandonment or entrapment does not occur in a
political vacuum, and an ally such as South Korea instead probably assesses BMD
as one piece of evidence about the overall commitment of the United States to
their mutual alliance.
NATO: From Fear of Abandonment to Alliance BMD. NATO’s initial encounter
with modern U.S. BMD, which focused on homeland defense during the George
W. Bush administration, fanned familiar fears of abandonment, but this anxiety
waned as U.S. missile-defense policy in Europe evolved to favor regional defense.
In the years around Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the European NATO allies did not consider ballistic missiles a threat, they expected BMD
to change mutual dependence and vulnerability, and they had broader doubts
about U.S. commitment. Not surprisingly, these factors stoked European fears of
abandonment. The shift to regional defense during the Obama administration
helped assuage these earlier fears and contributed to the alliance benefits that U.S.
policy predicts.
Even before the Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001,
the United States and its NATO allies disagreed on the relevance of BMD in the
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post–Cold War environment. The United States advocated national missile defense (NMD) to counter the threat that “rogue states” such as North Korea might
pose in the future.124 Europeans, however, did not think these missile threats were
imminent or compelling, particularly when compared with more-immediate
and proximate challenges such as terrorism or conflict in the Balkans.125 French
policy makers not only believed that the existing missile threat did not justify
BMD but worried further about how a missile-defense revival might threaten its
independent nuclear deterrent.126 For Europeans who already were concerned
about diminished U.S. interest in European security, NMD and the likely U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty—which some Europeans viewed as the foundation of nuclear stability—provided further evidence to complement anxieties
about U.S. reliability in the seemingly unipolar post–Cold War environment.127
Against this backdrop, the Bush administration’s 2006 proposal to put ten
GBI missiles in Poland and a supporting radar in the Czech Republic to defend
the United States and some of Western Europe against future Iranian ICBMs
resurrected European abandonment worries. The United States referred to the
proposal as the “third site,” because it would have been the third GBI base after
Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Both host
countries supported this initiative, which would have been a visible sign of U.S.
commitment to them and, like the presence of any other forward-deployed U.S.
forces, would have provided trip-wire benefits.128 However, the benefits were not
as evident to the rest of NATO, which still disagreed with the United States about
the relevance and likelihood of an ICBM threat from Iran.129 Furthermore, the
third site would have contributed only to the defense of some NATO members,
as well as the United States. Forward-deployed GBIs could not protect those
NATO members closest to Iran, in southeastern Europe.130 The decision also
negatively signaled U.S. commitment to multilateral alliance processes because
the United States negotiated the basing arrangements directly with the host
countries, bypassing NATO channels (which might have been slower and more
contentious).131 As with Sentinel, the United States seemed to have dodged the
difficult work of meaningfully consulting with most NATO allies about its BMD
plans.
Upon taking office in 2009, the Obama administration reassessed the missile
threat from Iran and U.S. BMD capabilities. American policy makers determined
that Iran was more likely to threaten Europe with shorter-range missiles than to
hold the United States at risk with ICBMs.132 Additionally, U.S. regional-defense
systems, particularly the Navy’s SM-3 interceptor, had proved themselves better
in testing than GBIs.133 So the Obama administration scrapped the not-yetfielded homeland defense–oriented third site and replaced it with the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), a regional-defense plan that included
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deploying BMD-capable USN ships to Europe and building Aegis Ashore sites in
Romania and Poland.134
Russian opposition to missile defense also influenced European attitudes and
Obama administration decisions. Russia suspected that the third site and EPAA
were in opposition to Russian strategic nuclear capabilities and opposed both
initiatives. Russia argued that the third site’s GBIs and the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor proposed for EPAA (but later canceled) would have had some capability
of defending the United States against Russian ICBMs and that Aegis Ashore’s
missile launchers could launch Tomahawk cruise missiles in violation of the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.135 The United States and NATO
disagreed with Russia’s positions.136 Russia’s opposition to the third site and to
the SM-3 Block IIB in EPAA likely influenced allied opinions about these weapons and U.S. decisions to cancel each program, particularly at a time when both
Western Europe and the United States sought to improve relations with Russia.137
Despite Russia’s unmistakable imprint on these BMD decisions, it remains
valuable to assess them from the intra-alliance perspective. Unlike the third site,
NATO allies favorably received EPAA in part because U.S. and NATO threat
perceptions more closely aligned, EPAA provided tangible defensive benefits to
European allies, and EPAA’s deployment has indicated U.S. commitment to Europe across administrations. Whereas European allies did not believe an Iranian
ICBM threat was imminent, they felt Tehran more plausibly could develop and
field missiles capable of reaching parts of Europe. Reflecting this common threat
assessment and new alliance-wide support for BMD, leaders of NATO countries
declared in 2010 that they should develop a “NATO missile defense capability”
that would include both EPAA and indigenous capabilities to defend all NATO’s
population and territory from ballistic-missile attack.138 This change in European
defense policy demonstrated that European NATO members recognized ballistic missiles as a threat and believed that U.S. BMD would benefit, rather than
exclude, them.
Under EPAA, relative dependence and vulnerability between the United States
and its allies did not change dramatically. Instead, the shift toward regional defense enabled European allies to reduce their vulnerability by hosting and integrating with U.S. BMD systems. EPAA serves as a component within a broader
multilateral effort by NATO members toward an “alliance-commanded” BMD
system, which will incorporate a variety of interoperable national systems.139
While it may be difficult to integrate multinational capabilities seamlessly, NATO’s
approach instead flexibly expands opportunities for participation and burden
sharing among alliance members, particularly ones that may not be able to afford
expensive U.S. equipment or may want to support domestic defense industries.
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U.S. BMD systems deployed to Europe as part of EPAA have provided tangible evidence of U.S. commitment to European defense across administrations.
Gustav Lindstrom, director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, describes EPAA as “now a core project for Europe and NATO, effectively
strengthening the relationship between NATO and the United States.” Therefore,
he argues, it also has become a “weather vane for gauging the state and ‘temperature’ of transatlantic relations.”140 Similarly, Catherine McArdle Kelleher at the
University of Maryland has described EPAA as a “barometer of U.S. support” for
NATO.141 That being the case, NATO allies closely watch EPAA for evidence of
continuity or change in the climate of U.S.-NATO relations. President Trump’s
continued support of EPAA has reassured many NATO allies.142 As described
earlier with regard to South Korea, while BMD cooperation constitutes just one
portion of a complex alliance relationship, for allies it may be a particularly useful
indicator of U.S. commitment because the amount of U.S. investment—in terms
of money, military systems, and people—is readily apparent.
Many factors influence whether and how NATO attitudes toward EPAA will
evolve in the future.143 Threat assessments may change or diverge. Some in Europe
expected the Iranian ballistic-missile threat to diminish following the 2015 Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Trump administration, however,
has disagreed with that benign threat assessment. Burden-sharing expectations
may shift. EPAA imposes few fiscal costs on the NATO alliance, but the Trump
administration seeks more financial contributions by allies.144 As missile-defense
capabilities improve, Russia likely will continue to pressure the NATO alliance to
curtail or abandon missile-defense efforts. These factors could upend the existing
alignment among NATO members about missile defense.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
BMD has become a fundamental element of the modern security environment
and it is appropriate for the United States to increase BMD investment, particularly in light of North Korea’s improving strategic arsenal and other countries’
quickly maturing advanced conventional threats, such as antiship ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. Missile defenses are, however, more than just
weapon systems with defensive capabilities and fiscal costs; they also have political benefits and drawbacks. Despite the policy consensus that BMD benefits U.S.
alliances, the historical record shows that BMD has not had this positive effect
consistently, and at times has caused allies to worry that the United States might
abandon or entrap them. Increasing U.S. BMD capabilities could pose these risks
again to U.S. alliances, even if U.S. policy makers do not intend that outcome.
The United States can manage these risks by sharing information to align U.S.
and allied perceptions of missile threats and BMD capabilities, promoting BMD
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cooperation in a manner that reduces both U.S. and allied vulnerability, and leveraging BMD policy and capabilities to maximize its value as a symbol of U.S.
alliance commitment.
Before an examination of the policy prescriptions, it is useful first to consider
several ways in which modern BMD might sow doubt in our allies’ perceptions of
alliance cohesion. First, increased U.S. spending on homeland-defense capabilities, such as improved sensors or larger numbers of interceptors, could make it
appear that the United States seeks to defend itself rather than allies and might
spark allied fears of abandonment.145 At what point in building BMD capability
and capacity might U.S. allies fear abandonment, and how can Washington limit
this effect? Second, the United States likely will continue to advocate interoperability across U.S. and allied BMD systems, which could cause some allies to worry
about entrapment risks. How can the United States assuage these concerns while
still benefiting from BMD interoperability? Lastly, President Trump’s combative
rhetoric toward traditional allies could cause them to question U.S. commitment
and view U.S. BMD investments through a clouded lens.
The factors that may influence an ally’s perception of U.S. BMD and the risks
of abandonment and entrapment—shared threat perceptions, relative dependence and vulnerability, and evidence of commitment—provide useful guideposts for understanding BMD’s effects on alliances and for designing policies that
could reinforce rather than undermine alliance cohesion. U.S. missile-defense
policy initiatives—such as increasing homeland-defense capability and capacity,
fielding more space-based sensors, and encouraging more BMD burden sharing
with allies—should be evaluated from an ally’s perspective, using this framework.
Divergent threat perceptions lie at the heart of each historical case in which an
ally worried about BMD’s effect on alliance cohesion, such as European NATO
members in the late 1960s, while closely aligned threat perceptions generally have
caused allies to view U.S. BMD capabilities favorably, such as Japan in the 2010s.
The United States should, or should continue to, share information about missile
threats with its allies to the greatest extent possible through diplomatic, intelligence, and even public affairs channels. This information will help allied leaders
and their people understand U.S. intent for deploying new BMD capabilities, but
also may help allies more fully appreciate the nature of the threat they face.
Just as BMD is more likely to improve alliance cohesion if both the United
States and its allies share a common threat perception, they also should understand the capabilities and limitations of U.S. BMD to counter these threats. For
example, the MDR proposes placing more emphasis on homeland defense and
advocates increasing the number of homeland-defense GBI missiles from fortyfour to at least sixty-four, improving the GBI’s warhead, and even employing
the Navy’s SM-3 Block IIA interceptor as an “underlay” to supplement GBIs.146
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An ally could perceive this new attention to homeland defense as a sign of U.S.
retrenchment and perhaps increased risk of abandonment.
An ally might try to understand whether and how these changes will affect U.S. capabilities. The 45 percent increase in GBIs likely would not result in a significant improvement in performance. With a shot doctrine—
referring to the number of defensive missiles launched against every incoming
ICBM—of two or four GBIs per target, the current U.S. homeland-defense system
probably can engage only about ten to twenty threat missiles.147 An informed observer could determine that adding twenty GBIs would enable the United States
to defend against only five to ten more missiles, at best. Improvements to U.S.
homeland defenses that are harder for an ally to quantify may be more likely to
raise concerns of abandonment. Employing the SM-3 Block IIA as a homelanddefense weapon, for example, would blur the previously clear lines between
homeland defense and regional weapon systems, and it would be difficult for an
observer to determine the quantity and types of weapons in the vertical launchers
of a BMD-capable ship or an Aegis Ashore site.148
Despite these potential challenges, an open dialogue with allies should express
that BMD alone is not likely to provide sufficient protection for the United States
but will instead remain a thin defense against a relatively small-scale attack, and
therefore only one part of U.S. security strategy. Put another way, capacity and
capability constraints might reassure U.S. allies about the extent and intent of
U.S. BMD systems, and thus limit concerns about alliance cohesion. Speaking
about how an adversary could view U.S. BMD, Frank Rose, then Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, said in 2016 that
he did not think BMD was destabilizing, because the United States has “limited
numbers, limited capabilities, and we have been very, very transparent about our
missile defenses.”149 Transparency with allies—particularly about missile-defense
budgets, procurement, testing, and deployment plans—may similarly stabilize
their perceptions of U.S. commitment. At least among democratic allies, transparency also may help voters in allied countries make better-informed decisions
about missile defense. Private and public transparency with U.S. allies about missile threats and defenses should continue.150
Not surprisingly, allies have responded favorably to BMD initiatives that do
not negatively affect the balance of relative dependence or vulnerability in the
alliance; they prefer BMD efforts that either directly improve their defenses or at
least do not subtract from their own security. The Western European experience
with Sentinel in the 1960s is a useful negative example; the United States would
not share Sentinel with NATO allies, and the parallel growth of Soviet ABM
capabilities could have reduced the value of some members’ nuclear deterrents.
This dual shift in relative vulnerability—the United States seemingly reducing its
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/5
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vulnerability while European NATO members’ vulnerability increased—likely
contributed to their fear of abandonment.
The United States should recognize when U.S. BMD capability improvements
might cause an ally to perceive a relative shift in their dependence or vulnerability. One way to achieve this result while improving U.S. homeland and regional
defenses would be to continue a U.S. policy of encouraging allies to acquire or
develop BMD systems and advocating interoperability with U.S. and other allied
BMD systems to the greatest extent possible. Not only will close cooperation
avoid an imbalance in relative vulnerability but it also likely increases mutual
dependence. BMD systems interoperability and information sharing could improve allied perceptions of BMD’s effect on an alliance. Consider two possible
outcomes if the United States expands its BMD sensor network in space, as the
2019 MDR proposes.151 If the United States withholds these sensor data from
allies, they could feel that U.S. battlespace awareness is improving while theirs
falls behind, perhaps leading to questions about alliance cohesion. If, however,
the United States shares data with allies using interoperable systems, they likely
would recognize the mutual benefits of this technology and view it as bolstering
their alliance.
U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation best exemplifies relative dependence and vulnerability moving in tandem. The close industrial and technological collaboration on the SM-3 Block IIA likely sends a clear message to Tokyo that Washington
could not field this advanced interceptor easily without its support. Similarly,
the role that Japan-based sensors such as the AN/TPY-2 radar play in defending
both Japanese and U.S. interests emphasizes the alliance’s mutually dependent
and beneficial character. The interoperability of U.S. and Japanese BMD-capable
destroyers also well demonstrates that U.S. and Japanese vulnerability against
shared missile threats rises or falls together rather than separately. The United
States should continue to grow and improve the BMD relationship with Japan
and foster similar industrial and operational bonds with other allies.
South Korea’s concern about THAAD creating risks of entrapment, or at least
entanglement, demonstrates a possible downside of efforts to share information
and integrate capabilities across national borders. The 2019 MDR prioritizes
cooperative BMD efforts that deepen integration across regions and between
homeland- and regional-defense systems, which may increase allied concerns
about entrapment further.152 Some analysts advocate separate informationsharing architectures to segregate different allies from each other and reduce
the apparent entanglement.153 This approach would impose additional costs on
the United States to develop, test, and upgrade parallel systems. Instead, if an
ally hesitates to join an integrated BMD network, the United States should still
encourage it to deploy defenses that retain the option of later joining the U.S.-led
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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architecture. This encouragement could include urging an ally to buy already interoperable U.S.-made systems or develop indigenous ones compatible with U.S.
networks. If an ally perceives an increased missile threat, it could join an allied
BMD architecture more quickly if it already has interoperable systems.
BMD’s relationship to allied perceptions of U.S. commitment is more complex.
Unlike the case with perceptions of threats and vulnerability, the broader crosscurrents of an alliance relationship shape perceptions of commitment. Nevertheless, BMD policy still shapes these views and should be explicit and credible. The
Trump administration’s policy values BMD as a positive factor in U.S. alliance
relationships, but presidential rhetoric, which is often critical of U.S. allies, risks
undermining the policy’s credibility. When President Trump unveiled the 2019
MDR, he emphasized homeland defense and took a transactional approach to
U.S. allies. He asserted that U.S. BMD “will prioritize the defense of the American people above all else,” which could revive an ally’s concerns of a “Fortress
America” approach. As for allies, he said “we will insist on fair burden sharing
with our allies. I’ve made it clear we are protecting many, many wealthy, wealthy,
wealthy, wealthy countries. . . . We protect all of these wealthy countries, which
I’m very honored to do, but many of them are so wealthy they can easily pay us
the cost of this protection.”154 While burden sharing is a fundamental reason why
states ally with each other, trying to account for the costs and benefits of missile
defense misses the wider view of an alliance’s value to the United States and could
foster an ally’s fears of abandonment.
To counter the mismatch between policy and presidential pronouncements,
the United States should continue to leverage BMD investment and employment
to signal credibly our support for our allies. Forward-deployed BMD systems,
such as Aegis Ashore, and BMD-capable ships based abroad amplify this signal
by embedding U.S. personnel in an ally’s territory and provide more-durable
indications of U.S. commitment than mobile or rotationally deployed systems,
which also signal U.S. commitment but could be removed more quickly.155 Regardless of a forward-deployed or -deployable BMD system’s capability (how
well or poorly it performs) or capacity (how many missiles it can engage), it still
tangibly signals U.S. commitment. Increasing the number of forward-deployed
BMD systems also might free up limited deployable U.S. and allied BMD-capable
systems, such as ships or Patriot batteries, to be used more efficiently and flexibly.156 The United States should continue fielding and operating Aegis Ashore in
Europe, support Japan’s efforts to purchase its own Aegis Ashore systems, and
identify other opportunities to deploy U.S. BMD capabilities forward.
{LINE SPACE}
Missile defense is a double-edged sword that can strengthen U.S. alliances, but
also could weaken them by causing an ally to fear abandonment or entrapment.
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Missile defense will remain an important component of U.S. security strategy,
but missile-defense policy, rhetoric, and actions should reinforce, rather than
undermine, U.S. alliances. To best leverage missile defense’s potential benefits to
alliances, the United States should continue to inform allies about missile threats
and U.S. defenses; share or integrate missile-defense capabilities with allies; and
use BMD deployments, cooperation, and consultation to demonstrate U.S. alliance commitment concretely. U.S. security strategy relies on both alliances and
missile defense, but U.S. policy makers should not take allies for granted while
pursuing technological solutions to geopolitical challenges.
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